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The University Nanosatellite Program (UNP) was founded in 1999 as the first government funded program to 
mentor university students in the design, integration, and operations of small satellites. UNP Employees have 
assisted in the development of over 80 satellites from a number of universities across the country. This paper 
presents the lessons learned from UNP's 19-year history of mentoring students in small satellite systems 
engineering. 
INTRODUCTION 
The University Nanosatellite Program (UNP) is a 
university-outreach program run out of the Air Force 
Research Laboratories (AFRL) at Kirtland Air Force 
Base in Albuquerque, NM. The program was founded 
in 1999 in order to facilitate small-satellite 
development at universities across the United States 
and was one of the first government-funded small-
satellite programs. 
The UNP office is run by a program coordinator and 
a team of systems engineers that continually monitor 
the progress of, at times, more than 15 teams in 
various phases of the program. Over the years, 
differences in the office team infrastructure and 
policy have yielded varying results in terms of the 
process the students take to achieve the completion of 
their satellites. Roles and responsibilities of 
employees of the UNP office have changed over the 
years as well as the methods employed to teach 
systems engineering. Despite these variances in 
administration, a number of common themes have 
been observed. This paper aims to consolidate these 
commonalities into a fixed set of lessons learned for 
the benefit of the university small-satellite 
community. 
The UNP has three main objectives, which are 
outlined in Figure 1. The primary objective is to 
educate students in best systems engineering practices 
in preparation for use in the workforce. Secondarily, 
the program aims to bolster small satellite technology 
development for industry and Department of Defense 
use. Lastly, the UNP program fosters the 
development of university satellite labs by giving 
them satellite-development resources and access to 
systems engineering training. 
 
Figure 1: UNP Objectives 
In order to accomplish these objectives, a rigorous 
four-phase program has been developed and refined. 
The current organization of the program, shown in 
Figure 2, is the result of iterative revisions over the 
course of 19 years. The four phases take the students 
through the complete satellite mission lifecycle, 
beginning with mission conception and requirements 
development, continuing through system design and 
implementation, and finishing with testing, launch, 
and operations. The phases themselves feature 
specific reviews that are administered by the program 
office and attended by a variety of industry partners 
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that participated in the program themselves as 
students or are interested in recruiting. 
 
Figure 2: UNP Phases 
LESSONS LEARNED 
This paper itself was written using inputs solicited 
from a wide variety of resources spanning the entire 
history of the UNP. Sources include university 
principal investigators, past student participants, 
industry supporters, and former UNP systems 
engineers. These individuals were asked to think of 
lessons learned from participating or administering 
the program. Responses were collected and sorted 
into three categories: 
1) Mission Management, i.e., dealing directly 
with systems engineering principles; 
2) Personnel Management, i.e., dealing with 
student and staff support given the 
constraints of the university setting;  
3) Project Management, i.e., dealing with 
timelines and university politics.   
Based on the information obtained from this group of 
respondents, a common theme emerged: problems 
caused by the risk associated with a shortage of 
monetary, personnel, and schedule limitations.  Some 
of this risk can be self-inflicted as a result of common 
difficulties associated with a workforce made largely 
of university students. Almost all of the lessons 
learned discussed in this paper can be traced back to 
causes and implications of one of these risks. 
Mission Management 
The first category of lessons learned is mission 
management. The application of systems engineering 
to a “real-word” application (i.e., a satellite mission) 
for the first time is challenging in any scenario, but 
the resource constraints in the university environment 
can introduce particular difficulties. By nature, 
universities tend to lack stable monetary and 
personnel resources because university research 
activities are generally funded on a project-by-project 
basis and are limited to a largely student workforce. 
When attempting to navigate a full space-mission 
lifecycle, this workforce is often overtasked as it 
consists entirely of part-time student engineers. 
Additionally, the student workforce is by definition 
not made up of “career” employees and is thus highly 
susceptible to turnover, sometimes as often as every 
semester. Such constant turnover creates an urgency 
in schedule as the full satellite must be completed 
before too much engineering knowledge is lost.  
Difficulties caused by resource limitations manifest 
themselves throughout the project lifecycle, 
beginning with design tasks. In this phase (Phase A in 
Figure 2), university teams tend to struggle with a 
common set of issues. Firstly, lack of resources limits 
the scope of what a university satellite mission can 
accomplish. In some cases, the students cannot assess 
mission feasibility accurately until too far into the 
design process because of inexperience projecting 
resource needs. Often, university teams fail to 
appropriately take into account the resource 
requirements associated with both payload and 
spacecraft bus development. In the past, successful 
universities have found ways to make some aspect of 
spacecraft bus development a mission objective or 
levy the development of a main payload on another 
entity in order to divide the work and reduce resource 
strain. Others are able to design missions that do not 
require the development of overly complex systems 
in the spacecraft payload or bus. With simpler 
mission concepts, mission design and verification 
become more achievable in a resource-strained 
environment. Proper feasibility studies are also a key 
part in determining how much effort will be required 
to accomplish proposed mission concepts. 
Validation of the mission concept both in terms of 
feasibility and design of an appropriate concept of 
operations (CONOPs) is another Phase A task in 
which problems have been found to arise, this time 
somewhat self-inflicted due to lack of experience. If 
the mission concept is not developed adequately 
during the creation of the mission proposal, mission 
success criteria tend to be ill-defined at conception 
and may change throughout the development process. 
Without firm mission success criteria, it becomes 
difficult to develop appropriate requirements. Teams 
with ill-defined requirements then struggle to finalize 
a mission design and are unable to create verification 
and validation plans that reinforce success criteria. 
University teams that have spent time developing the 
mission concept during the proposal and pre-proposal 
stage before the beginning of Phase A are more likely 
to be able to move forward in their development 
process without having to backtrack due to poor 
requirements. These teams have kept design and 
verification paths in mind during the development of 
the mission concept and CONOPs and do not 
encounter as many problems at implementation. 
Software development -- from a design standpoint -- 
also leads to difficulties. When teams largely made of 
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systems, mechanical, and electrical engineers attempt 
to write spacecraft software, they tend to skip design 
and immediately try to implement solutions. The 
common theme in teams that are able to make it 
through both design and verification of their 
spacecraft is an understanding of the systems-
engineering processes involved in software 
development. Proper configuration management, 
requirements definition, and verification planning is 
necessary for both hardware-related and software-
related work. These concepts must be recognized and 
applied far before implementation as part of the 
definition process. In some cases, teams that do not 
complete these tasks early must pause their timelines 
in order to equalize progress on software and 
hardware. In others, teams attempt to move on to 
verification and validation and find that they are 
unable to finalize their software due to a continuous 
stream of bugs. In general, teams that make it through 
Phase B have spent time planning software 
infrastructure and design before attempting 
implementation. 
All three of these risks can be mitigated by planning 
vigorously during the first half of spacecraft 
development. This requires a greater investment of 
time into the first half of the systems engineering 
process in order to avoid unnecessary slow-downs in 
the second half. 
Personnel Management 
The next major category that was called out in survey 
responses was personnel-related lessons learned. The 
primary link between all successful UNP teams is the 
right combination and management of personnel. 
A number of responses called out common roles that 
need to be filled in order to complete a small-satellite 
mission. From an interpersonal standpoint, one 
reviewer divided the tasks into four major roles1. The 
first of these roles is a motivating force behind the 
team. This individual is aware of the overall vision 
and mission scope and works to spread that vision 
across the team and to stakeholders. This role often 
delves into the political side of the project and is thus 
usually held by the principal investigator of the 
mission. The second role is the source of the team’s 
momentum. These individuals complete the bulk of 
the design and implementation. In order to function 
well, they enable each other and the rest of the team 
as they complete tasks. The third role is a verification 
role. These individuals handle verification of the 
implemented design created by others. The last role 
requires emotional intelligence and manages the 
meshing of the team. These individuals work to 
ensure that the team remains cohesive through day-
to-day operations. These roles can overlap and can be 
carried out by almost any team member. If any of 
these roles is not filled, the teams are at risk of 
encountering problems that may prevent completion 
of the satellite. The best UNP teams are teams that 
feature all four types of team member. 
From an engineering standpoint, there are also a wide 
variety of technical roles that need to be filled. 
Interdisciplinary teams that incorporate electrical, 
mechanical, and computer science disciplines in 
addition to the more obvious systems and aerospace 
disciplines are able to assign tasks to the most 
equipped individuals. Teams that feature individuals 
with such diverse background skillsets can thereby 
reduce the amount of time spent learning specialized 
topics during satellite development. 
These aspects of personnel management can be 
applied to a team in any setting, but there are certain 
problems that universities face on larger scales by 
virtue of having a predominantly student workforce. 
First, recruiting is a large part of personnel 
management. Many university teams cannot pay the 
student population for their efforts, so many new 
recruits (as well as established team members) must 
have other motivations for working on the mission 
while also completing university coursework. If the 
student base is largely unmotivated, the team will 
suffer overall. Additionally, turnover is guaranteed in 
a university setting, sometimes as often as every 
semester. Turnover can significantly lengthen the 
timeline of satellite development unless managed 
actively and consistently. Teams that enforce a 
“deputy” role that shadows the primary lead for at 
least a semester for all student leadership positions 
are more likely to be able to keep development 
continuous and can avoid the re-completion of work. 
Project Management 
The third and final survey response category is 
project management. This section deals largely with 
alleviating the shortage of resources and common 
risks from which university teams suffer. Successful 
project management can manifest itself both in the 
systems engineering process and in the navigation of 
university politics. 
By far the most important factor in the success of a 
university small satellite mission is schedule. 
Timeline can become a high-risk item in university 
settings because of issues like high and frequent 
turnover rates, and student obligations like class and 
internships. Successful student managers are able to 
use timelines as motivation for the team while 
avoiding both overstressing the team by pushing too 
hard and allowing the timeline to slip by becoming 
too lax. For example, successful managers have used 
the launch manifestation process as motivation. UNP 
finds launches on behalf of university teams and 
works with the launch provider and the university 
team to complete the launch integration process at a 
certain point in the program’s timeline. Manifesting 
too early causes overstrain, while manifesting too late 
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perpetuates eternal hardware and software 
development. By recognizing these risks and aiming 
for an appropriate manifestation date, student 
managers are able to renew motivation at the right 
time during the verification and validation phases of 
the project. 
Another example of timeline management is the use 
of student-enforced internal reviews. Because Phase 
B is progress based, teams can potentially go long 
durations (e.g., multiple years) without a formal UNP 
review. Student managers that enforce internal 
reviews are able to create intermediate milestones for 
their team to work toward during those periods of 
time. In this way, a university team is able to push its 
schedule forward and combat the risk of losing too 
much engineering knowledge by taking too long to 
finish the spacecraft. 
Regarding resource shortage, the development of a 
university satellite lab requires the procurement of 
specialized equipment and software, for example 
ESD safe tools, thermal modelling software, and 
oscilloscopes and other test equipment. Additionally, 
a clean space is required in which to assemble a flight 
unit of a spacecraft. Predictably, schools that already 
have this type of lab infrastructure in place are 
generally able to move through the mission lifecycle 
more quickly than those that do not. New schools can 
build up spacecraft development infrastructure by 
varying sources of income while in the UNP 
program. 
A final important factor related to project 
management is the support given by the university 
that houses a given small-satellite lab. Such support is 
crucial not only to an individual mission but to the 
long-term health of the lab itself. Primarily, lab space 
and overall support for the endeavor are required for 
the completion of the satellite and maintenance of the 
lab. Such support that can be helpful includes base 
funding, funding for the payment of students and 
staff, and promotional support for recruiting 
purposes.  University labs that receive more support 
are able to focus more on the completion of the 
satellite and less on the sustainment of the base-level 
resources they need in order to operate. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper discusses a set of lessons learned from 19 
years of the University Nanosatellite Program, drawn 
from the responses of surveys given to individuals 
with a variety of relationships with the UNP. These 
lessons are meant to inform university students, staff, 
and faculty of some common concepts to watch out 
for in their pursuit of completing a university small 
satellite. Though, by its nature, this paper focuses on 
traditional problem areas, the goal is not to 
discourage any university from participating in the 
UNP or similar programs. No school is able to avoid 
every pitfall and heed every piece of advice presented 
in this paper. However, awareness of these concepts 
can help a school successfully develop a satellite 
mission. Finally, it is emphasized that, regardless of 
the mission outcome of each university’s small-
satellite program, the primary objective of the UNP is 
education. We believe that any attempt made to build 
a university small satellite imparts an invaluable 
amount of knowledge and experience to the students 
and should be supported and continued. 
NOTES 
1 – Quoted from the response of George Hunyadi of 
DigitalGlobe. 
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